Debugging Services

Attorneys' Investigative Consultants

A part of our business is providing Technical Security Countermeasures Services (TSCM), commonly know as sweeps or debuggings. When we look at the marketing of these services, we find some interesting things.

Other than what they have seen on TV and in the movies, most people know little about the threat of electronic surveillance.

Other than what they have seen on TV and in the movies, most people know little about sweeps and debuggings.

What is portrayed on TV and in the movies about these subjects is almost uniformly false and misleading. For example, a procedure that in the real world could be expected to take one or two hours, is condensed down to 15 or 20 seconds on TV. The need to dramatize and maintain interest are controlling and accuracy and authenticity go by the wayside. Everybody knows this, yet when the time comes to make a real decision about a suspected threat in the real world, many clients go back to the only frame of reference they know - TV and movies.

TSCM services are unique in that only a part of the population know they exist. Of those who know they exist, only a small segment are likely targets for electronic surveillance. Of those who are aware of such services and who might in fact need a sweep, there are a number who just can't afford one.

From the foregoing it is clear that the market for TSCM services is relatively thin and unsophisticated. When a buyer is unsophisticated, he can easily make a mistake in the kind of services he buys.

Our purpose in producing this web page is to educate all who want to take the time to learn. It is our belief that if we can create hard headed, sophisticated, buyers, we will have created an atmosphere in which both we and our clientele can prosper.

Electronic Intelligence Gathering and the Management of Counterintelligence in the Business World

Before we go any further, I would like to share with you portions of a letter I wrote almost 10 years ago to a countermeasures practitioner back east. The reason I am including it here, 10 years after the fact, is because in my opinion not too much has changed.

"... I conclude that we share at least some of the same concerns. Two that I have are:

1. A lack of awareness and even skepticism on the part of too many decision makers and their Security Managers that a viable threat exists.

2. A lack of sophistication on the part of too many of those same people that limits their criteria in selecting a countermeasures approach or contractor to the one thing that they truly understand - price.

Recently, we had an occurrence which seems to be aiding in the solution of the first problem. About two weeks ago a store called The Spy Factory opened here in Las Vegas. This is one of six stores operating under that same name in Texas, California, Arizona and Nevada. I visited The Spy Factory and saw, in part, the following fully operational devices available for sale (and being sold) to whomever was willing to plunk down the $200-$800 that was being charged:

1. General Description.

1.1 Battery powered RF room bugs.

1.2 Leech type RF phone taps.

1.3 Mains powered RF room bugs including a disguised cube tap.

1.4 A fountain pen transmitter. Not observed was a pocket calculator which according to their catalog, can be ordered.

1.5 Where trademarks were visible, I saw either the Cony Manufacturing Company or the Micro Security and Electronic logo.

1.6 Dedicated receivers were available for all transmitters.

1.7 They claim a range for these devices between 50 feet and 600 meters.

1.8 Aside from miniaturization and disguised packaging, there did not appear to be any sort of cover or counter detection technology associated with any of these devices.

2. The following frequencies were being used on crystal controlled devices that I saw.

2.1 398.605 MHz

2.2 399.445 MHz

2.3 139.940 MHz

3. The following were frequency ranges were used on the variable frequency devices I saw.

3.1 76-108 MHz

3.2 87-114 MHz

3.3 87-93 MHz

3.4 87-108 MHz

Of course they were also selling the usual range of overpriced and ineffective or marginally effective "Bug Detectors", and we have already gotten some calls (but not jobs) predicated on what appear to be false positives from those. But, the principal attraction here are the offensive devices which appear to be in clear violation of Title III. I'm puzzled as to how these places continue to operate and in fact flourish.

Regardless of the reason for their being allowed to operate, the presence of the store here completely changes the equation. The risk is now both visible and viable. We have already had lay clients acknowledge that they visited the store and that they see the threat potential. In short, as long as these outlets sell these types of devices, we can not only look for a broader understanding of the problem by our potential clients, we can also look for more finds during sweeps. "

(Epilogue - In 1992, using threats of major fines, the FCC forced these outlets to stop selling these devices. Although that step forced a part of that market underground, it did little to curtail the availability of such devices to anyone with the money and the motivation.)

Although shrouded in secrecy, bugging is an ever present fact of life in the business world. The Security Professional, Attorney or Businessperson who does not have an accurate understanding of this very serious threat and the specific methods of dealing with it, is shorting himself and those who trust him.

We are here give you the he knowledge you need. The following are our training objectives:

Be familiar with methodology and limitations of both the attackers and the defenders in this "Secret War".

Be able to work with a countermeasures professional to evaluate the potential for he, his client or his company falling victim to such an attack.

Be able to independently weigh the counterintelligence options that are available.

Be able to decide upon which counterintelligence options to use and when to use them.

Have a competent understanding of the theory behind a sweep.

Be able to evaluate the options and decide upon the scope of the sweep.

Have an understanding of probable effectiveness of a sweep.

Be able to independently evaluate cost factors in a sweep.

Be able to ask your debugging practitioner the following questions and feel comfortable in asking the questions and confident in evaluating his answers.

Precisely what are you going to do to detect active RF (Radio Frequency devices)?

Specifically, what are you going to do to detect RF devices that have been turned off or have dead batteries?

How about hard wired devices?

Outline for me what you are going to do to detect telephone related devices?

Tell me about IR (Infra Red), laser or other exotic devices. What procedures will you use to surface these?

I understand that every defensive measure has its weak spots or limitations. What approaches, types or classes of devices could go undetected with the procedures you plan to employ?

Free Consultation - Call 702-453-4500 E-Mail - Investigations@LasVegasPI.com